24.1 Decline and Fall of the British Motorcycle.

Date: Mon, 24 Jun 1996 11:17:40 -0400 (EDT)
From: Allan Johnson

While there is no doubt that the failure to develop a lightweight motorcycle to compete with the Honda Cub scooter/lightweight motorcycle line was one of the major nails in the coffin of the British motorcycle industry, I would suggest that economic and political conditions had a great deal more to do with British motorcycle decline than is generally admitted.

From the late 1920's (references can be supplied if Dr. Falco needs them), the British industry was torn between concentrating on the sporting or practical commuter market. Luckily for them in the 1930's, 40's and 50's the great overproduction of the 20's and early 30's meant the domestic commuter market could obtain very cheap transport from the second hand market. This was supplemented by a great many ex-WWII motorcycles in the 40's and 50's. The commuter market which was a little more flush made do with the Villiers-engined lightweights, Bantams, Cubs and Stars, along with a variety of continental lightweights.

The British industry could make its real money in the Export markets selling sporting and recreational motorcycles, rationalising that it cost nearly as much to make a 250 as a 500cc bike by their traditional methods.

Meanwhile, the Labour govt. of the 1940's had introduced heavy death duties as part of taxation and this led to the selling out of most of the individuals who owned British factories. In order to keep their wealth, such as it was, they had to invest it offshore to avoid losing the vast majority of it in tax upon their deaths. This led to sell-outs to larger conglomerates or corporate structures by Ariel & Triumph (Jack Sangster), Norton (Gilbert Smith), Francis-Barnett (Arthur Barnett), James, etc. while such firms were still viable. This replaced knowledgeable owners with a personal interest in the companies, with managers who were at the whims of shareholders, the annual general meetings and the banks. This also happened to Indian (1920's and 40's) and (almost) H-D (70's - 80's).

Firms like Vincent and later Velocette soldiered on until the banks eventually closed them down. Other firms, such as Excelsior, Levis, Brough Superior, Rudge, Sunbeam (Marston's) and Douglas went into other products and lines of work. Many survived or had long periods of commercial success.

The one shining but only partly successful attempt to make a modern "everyman's" commuter motorcycle was the Velocette LE. It failed because the size of market for a quality but simple motorcycle for the non-enthusiast who needed to travel to work did not exist in England. The overseas market for this bike did not seem to exist or be exploited, in some areas (US and Canada) its engine was considered by the company to be too small, in third world countries it was probably too expensive. The lack of market for the planned numbers of LEs that Velocette wanted (and had to) produce led to their eventual closure.

The latter history of the conglomerates (BSA, AMC) shows considerable lack of managerial skill in almost every aspect, product design, engineering, cost and production engineering, production scheduling, production quality, marketing, service and sales. This was principally due to the loss of knowledgeable company owners and experienced employees. As long as there was a certain pride and loyalty in the building of their products, the British industry could survive; when that disappeared, the writing was on the wall.

Allan Johnson

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24.2 More on the Decline and Fall of the British Motorcycle.

Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 17:09:43 +0100 (BST)
From: D.J. Walker

Dear All,
The "isolastic" system we're describing for the Triumph Twins isn't the same as the Anti-Vibe frame, is it? _That_ found its way onto a production model, didn't it?

From here on, my dialogue wanders, those of you who don't care for my style of writing, simple hit "d".

The problem which is often overlooked, when studying the demise of the British motorcycle industry, is that, that small island race of bad-tempered bastards with an appalling history of Imperial rule, and warlike aggressiveness... the Japanese, have _very_much_ the same notions about what a motorcycle should _be_ as that small island race of bad-tempered bastards with an appalling history of Imperial rule, and warlike aggressiveness... the British.

When you counter the big time, sluggish dependability of the German motorcycles of the 60s and 70s, the ultra lightweight elegance of the Italian motorcycles of the period, and the massive straight-line mile eating emphasis of the pre-evo HD, there isn't really a comparison to be found, with the aggressive, gung-ho, in-you-face attitude-problem, conveyed by bikes like the Honda 750/4, and the Kawasaki Z900.

The reason the NVT conglomerate found it impossible to compete with Japan, was not simply because they were up against a class of machine immeasurably superior to their own products - all of the European and American competition was equally antediluvian - but because they were competing for exactly the same market. The fireblade is as much a product of the "maximise everything at the expense of common-sense, comfort and practicality", school of thinking, as a Bonneville, Commando or Thunderbird. The fact that the Japanese 4 could do everything a British bike, of the time, could do (except, perhaps _handle_) and offered far more power per cc, is the reason I think the British industry had the fight lost as soon as the Blackbomber came on the scene.

Your HD customer's going to buy a HD, aren't they? When the Brit bike appeared on your American market, they, to a large extent, created a market demand that hadn't been there before. Take a look at the number of motorcycles sold in the US and Canada, before the Brits came on the scene. The Brit-bike created a new market, then had it stolen off them, when the Japanese came along and offered a better product to that same market. Although HD benefited from the increased interest in motorcycling, that resulted, they weren't really in the same race, and they didn't get nearly as badly stung. In many ways, their market share simply returned to what it had been, prior to the arrival of the British. This is why I fear for HDs future: they've created a new market, on the European mainland (their major export market) amongst customers who aren't turned on by the gung-ho bikes from Japan. Now the Japanese are selling bikes like the XV535, which is as fast as an 883 Sportster, is better finished and in many ways a nicer looking bike, and falls into a lower insurance bracket, owing to its smaller engine. HD isn't producing enough bikes to meet the demand it's created, and stands a good chance of losing this hard-earned market to the Japanese, especially when Honda can sell us Europeans a bike with: "Made in the US of A" written on it.

The argument that Brit bikes are loveable because they're easy to work on, simply doesn't hold water either. An 8-valve Japanese 4 is a doodle to overhaul, not least because it's held together with only one kind of bolt, using one system of head-sizes, and none of the fastenings are situated in positions where you can only reach them using a 1/4inch headed 1/4drive, Whitworth socket on the end of an extension bar which must be no shorter than 2 and 1/3rd inches, but no longer than 3 and 1/8th inches, otherwise you either can't get it in, or it catches on the frame as you twist the bolt out... etc. I think because we've all become so good at working on our bikes, through necessity, and we've accumulated such an assortment of oddly shaped tools and odd sized spanners, we've simply forgotten what a total pain in the arse they are, to overhaul.

So, yes vibration, and primitive, over-stretched designs is part of why the Brits went down with all hands, but it doesn't explain it all. It wasn't a factor for BMW (whose designs are so reliable, owing to the steam engine technology that resides within their crankcases), nor the Italians (whose bikes were fast and unreliable, owing to the fact that they were held together entirely with string, chewing gum and good hope - and to some extent remain so) nor the Americans (who aimed their bikes at a market that shunned sophistication - maybe this will be their salvation, but will such a market exist, in the 21st Century, where miles-per-gallon values are liable to have to reach into double figures, if you're going to sell any bikes).

And so the Hinkley, Triumph... Wildly popular with the Europeans, especially the Germans, who've always had an affection for the Triumph name (perhaps some racial-memory, from the days when there were two companies called "Triumph").

Bikes like the Tiger hit the enduro market like a bolt from the blue. That smooth three-cylinder engine was far more refined than the one-lung pluggers offered by Honda, and Kawasaki. The fact that the Triumph bikes resemble Japanese offerings is no coincidence. We'd have been making bikes like that, over here, anyway, if the Japanese hadn't knocked our industry out of the picture.

many of you will feel hurt by the bad things I've said about Brit bikes, but the truth is that it's better (more realistic) to look at the good points about bikes, like my Commando, from the vantage point afforded from atop it's vast mountain of bad points: to look down on it, and say: "Despite all of this, I still love it because of this.. and this... and this", rather than persevere in longwinded discussions about whose parallel twin is the best, or whose bike leaks least, when the rest of the world has moved on, and nobody else is listening.

Dan

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